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Abstract: This paper investigates a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a 
manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer, where the retailer exhibits fairness concerns. Cooperative and non-
cooperative game theoretic analyses are employed to characterize interactions among different parties. 
Analytical results confirm the conventional wisdom: with the retailer’s fairness concerns, the channel profits 
under the decentralized and partial-coalition models underperform that under the centralized model. To find an 
appropriate profit allocation scheme to coordinate the supply chain system with fairness concerns, we resort to 
the cooperative game theory. To this end, we first derive the characteristic function form of the cooperative game 
based on the equilibrium profits under centralized, decentralized and different partial-coalition models. 
Subsequently, we propose three coordination mechanisms based on the Shapley value, nucleolus solution, and 
equal satisfaction to allocate surplus profit. The three mechanisms are then evaluated by using numerical 
experiments. We further examine how the retailer’s fairness concerns affect profit allocation under the three 
mechanisms. The key innovation is to incorporate the retailer’s fairness concerns into the coordination of a three-
echelon CLSC. Our contributions are twofold: First, cooperative game-theoretic mechanisms are put forward to 
coordinate the three-echelon CLSC with a fairness-minded retailer. Second, we investigate how the retailer’s 
fairness concerns affect the CLSC members’ pricing decision and surplus profit allocation. Our studies confirm 
that the resulting profit allocation schemes satisfy both individual and collective rationality and fall in the core of 
the cooperative game, thereby making the grand coalition stable and suggesting viable options to coordinate the 
CLSC system. Further analyses reveal that different coordination mechanisms benefit the three CLSC members 
differently. These research findings help CLSC managers to understand what options are available and identify 
possible pathways for them to foster cooperation and achieve equitable allocation of surplus profit. 
Keywords: Closed-loop supply chain; Cooperative game; Fairness concerns; Coordination; Profit allocation.
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1. Introduction
Increasing environmental pressure, stricter legislation, and competitive business environment 
have led more and more firms to engage in remanufacturing and recycling used products, 
resulting in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). A popular trend in CLSC management is that 
the members join coalitions and pool their critical resources to enhance their power in the 
supply chain (Jena and Sarmah, 2014; Leng and Parlar, 2009; Nagarajan and Sošić, 2008; 
Zhang and Liu, 2013). For example, it has been recognized that forging partnerships is key for 
automakers to succeed in recycling and remanufacturing auto parts in end-of-use automobiles 
(IRIS, 2010). In Europe, Tesla works with Umicore to recycle and recover electric vehicle 
batteries and resell them to battery manufacturers. This is not only an attractive recycling 
mechanism from an environmental perspective, but it also provides a substantial source of 
revenue (Gu et al., 2018). For distributors, they are closer to customers and have a better 
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understanding of market conditions. As such, they tend to be more receptive to 
remanufacturing and are willing to take more responsibility in collaborating with 
manufacturers (Li et al., 2011). In CLSCs, distributors often partner with manufacturers in 
collecting used products (Jena and Sarmah, 2014). For instance, as a distributor of a Japanese 
general machinery maker, Komatsu Ltd., Nanjing Gangjia Komatsu Construction Machinery 
Limited not only sells new products but also cooperates with Komatsu in renewing and 
reselling used products in Jiangsu and Xinjiang, China (Xiong and Wang, 2011). Similarly, 
Lei Shing Hong Machinery, the distributor of Caterpillar Machinery in Shanghai and Jiangsu, 
works with Caterpillar in remanufacturing old equipment and reselling it to the marketplace 
(Xiong and Wang, 2011). By forming strategic alliances and sharing information with other 
members in a CLSC, a firm can enhance both individual and channel profitability. Therefore, 
it has become a critical issue to understand how to foster cooperation in a CLSC (Chen et al., 
2017b).
Under a cooperative framework, how can supply chain members navigate through the 
competitive environment and be incentivized to remain committed to cooperation? An 
equitable profit allocation scheme serves as a viable solution. To address this issue, 
researchers have proposed many contracting forms, such as quantity discount, buy-back, two-
part tariff, revenue-sharing contracts and mail-in rebate (Govindan and Popiuc, 2014; Noori-
daryan et al., 2018; Saha et al., 2016; Taleizadeh et al., 2016; Taleizadeh et al., 2018b). 
Another line of thinking is to resort to the cooperative game theory as it examines all possible 
coalition outcomes and what players can achieve individually as well as through forming 
coalitions. In addition, it also addresses the stability and robustness of different coalitions and 
how surplus is allocated among coalition members (Nagarajan and Sošić, 2008). The first step 
in applying the cooperative game theory is to identify the set of all possible coalition 
outcomes and characterize its properties, thereby determining how players ultimately gain 
from different outcomes in this set. Existing applications of cooperative game models tend to 
address the allocation issue by employing any arbitrary coalition structure and assuming equal 
power among members (Granot and Sošić, 2003; Guajardo and Rönnqvist, 2016; Guardiola et 
al., 2009; Meca et al., 2004). This treatment makes it easy to identify the set of all possible 
coalition outcomes; however, a CLSC is featured with a more complex coalition structure 
where certain horizontal and vertical coalitions cannot be formed due to different reasons such 
as unequal power status among members. To understand the coalition structure of a CLSC, 
we first consider it in a non-cooperative environment and examine the case where different 
players carry out CLSC operations based on their individual considerations. This 
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noncooperative game model is subsequently employed to generate the set of all possible 
coalition outcomes, furnishing the basis for further analysis in the cooperative setting. 
Non-cooperative game theoretic models have been extensively employed in CLSC 
management to delineate the competitive environment, characterize interaction among players, 
and analyze pricing strategies and their implications on profitability. At the micro level, these 
models are convenient tools for examining the bargaining power of different members and 
determining contracting parameters based on equilibriums in a CLSC (Nagarajan and Sošić, 
2008). This equilibrium analysis is an important step that must be taken before cooperative 
game models can be entertained to address surplus profit allocation in a CLSC owing to 
cooperation between member firms.
To properly allocate the resulting surplus profit, the cooperative game theory provides 
many potential solutions. Among these alternatives, one-point solution concepts (Li, 2016) 
such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus solution, and the Equal Profit Method (EPM) are 
sensible choices as they each provide a unique allocation scheme if existent. The Shapley 
value is calculated by averaging a member’s marginal contributions to all coalitions under all 
possible orderings (Bilbao and Edelman, 2000). The nucleolus solution is derived by 
lexicographically minimizing the largest degree of dissatisfaction (Arin and Feltkamp, 1997). 
The EPM aims to allocate profit to each participant as equally as possible and can be 
formulated as a linear program (Frisk et al., 2010). These three cooperative game approaches 
will be employed as the basis to allocate surplus profit as a result of cooperation among CLSC 
members in this research. 
Generally, the aforementioned research assumes that the agents are completely rational. 
In reality, decision-makers often exhibit bounded rationality and demonstrate different social 
preferences such as fairness concerns. Although relatively limited studies incorporate 
noneconomic considerations into CLSCs, these behavioural factors do influence CLSC 
members’ decisions and channel profit (Ma et al., 2017). In today’s industrial practice, 
sustainable cooperation and fairness concerns widely coexist in CLSCs. For instance, Gree 
Inc., one of the world largest specialized air-conditioner manufacturer in China, establishes 
coalitions with different firms, such as Tianjian Recycling Development Co., Ltd and 
Shijiazhuang Green Recycling Co., Ltd, to assist them in remanufacturing and distributing  its 
products (Gree, 2018). These firms are not only involved in Gree’s import and export 
distribution business, but they also collect and remanufacture its used products. Gree and its 
supply chain partners coordinate their operations in many ways, and Gree often invests in 
their infrastructure construction such as collection and distribution networks. But supply chain 
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relationships are not always harmonious. Gome, one of the largest household appliance 
retailers in China, decided to terminate its cooperation with Gree in March 2004 after its 
demand for higher-than-normal kickbacks was rejected by Gree. Gome, in this case, was 
concerned with distributional fairness and wanted to capitalize on its dominating power in the 
retailing industry to extract more profit from the manufacturer. (Chen and Wu, 2013; Liu et 
al., 2015). This case demonstrates that a focal firm in a CLSC (e.g., the manufacturer) has to 
pay close attention to the coordination mechanism so that sustainable cooperation can be 
achieved when some partners are fairness-minded. Existing literature suggests that the 
channel profit usually suffers when supply chain members negotiate profit-sharing in typical 
coordination contracts under noneconomic preferences such as risk aversion and fairness 
concerns (Nagarajan and Sošić, 2008; Nie and Du, 2017). It remains largely unaddressed 
regarding how to formulate proper profit allocation schemes to facilitate cooperation at 
maximal channel efficiency with fairness-minded players. We attempt to address this issue by 
resorting to the cooperative game theory. 
More specifically, we incorporate the retailer’s fairness concerns into a typical three-
echelon CLSC consisting of a manufacturer (M), a distributor (D), and a retailer (R). Four 
scenarios are examined: (1) The centralized case where a central planner makes integrated 
decisions for the three members (CC); (2) The decentralized case where the three members 
make independent decisions (CD); (3) M and D form a coalition (MD); and (4) D forms a 
coalition with R (DR). This basic setting emphasizes D’s irreplaceable role in the CLSC so 
that M and R cannot form a coalition without D. This research attempts to address the 
following three questions: (1) How to derive equilibrium pricing decisions, production 
quantities and profits for the CLSC with R’s fairness concerns under the CC, CD, MD, and 
DR models based on the Stackelberg game setting? (2) How to allocate surplus profit by using 
cooperative game theoretic approaches? (3) What is the impact of R’s fairness concerns on 
the performance of the three proposed coordination mechanisms?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A brief review of literature is 
presented in Section 2. Section 3 describes the problem under consideration, followed by 
notation and assumptions in Section 4. Stackelberg equilibrium results are obtained for the 
centralized (CC), decentralized (CD), and two partial-coalition models (MD and DR) in 
Section 5. Three cooperative game theoretic mechanisms are then presented to coordinate the 
CLSC members in Section 6. Section 7 evaluates the performance of the three coordination 




In a multi-echelon CLSC, extensive game-theoretic analyses have been carried out from 
various perspectives, such as inventory systems (Hasanov et al., 2018), defective product 
returns (Taleizadeh and Noori-daryan, 2015; Taleizadeh et al., 2015), marketing effort 
(Zerang et al., 2018), product recycling uncertainties (Alamdar et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2016), 
different channel power structures (Taleizadeh et al., 2017a), and channel selections 
(Taleizadeh et al., 2018a). Based on the research questions in this paper, we focus our review 
on the cooperation and coordination of three-echelon CLSCs, applications of cooperative 
game approaches to conventional supply chains and CLSCs, and coordination of supply 
chains with fairness concerns. 
2.1. Cooperation and coordination of multi-party CLSCs
A critical issue in channel operations is cooperation and coordination of CLSCs, which has 
attracted considerable attention in academia and practice. Most of the existing studies are 
concerned with two-echelon CLSCs, and limited research has been carried out regarding 
three-echelon CLSCs (Govindan et al., 2013; Heydari et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017). For 
instance, within a dual-recycling CLSC consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-
party collector, Taleizadeh et al. (2018a) develop an integrated two-tariff and cooperative 
advertising contract to coordinate the system and enhance each member’s profit. In a fuzzy 
three-echelon CLSC setting, Alamdar et al. (2018) examine all possible alliance strategies and 
propose a new coordination mechanism that combines a fixed payment with a cost sharing 
component. In a CLSC with a manufacturer, a third-party remanufacturer, and a retailer, 
Zhang and Ren (2016) formulate a coordinated pricing mechanism that combines two-part 
tariff with a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate this supply chain. Saha et al. (2016) 
examine a CLSC comprising a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party collector and design 
a three-way discount mechanism to coordinate the channel and achieve a win-win situation 
for the three members. These studies show how different contract designs can coordinate the 
system and achieve a win-win profit allocation for all CLSC members, but they tend to ignore 
the impact of different coalition/cooperation structures on the members’ bargaining powers in 
their negotiation for surplus profit allocation. To fill this gap in the literature, Ma et al. (2016) 
analyze the coalition formation process in a three-echelon CLSC consisting of a manufacturer, 
a retailer, and two recyclers. In the presence of a return policy, Taleizadeh et al. (2017b) 
perform a game-theoretic analysis on a joint pricing and alliance selection decision-making 
problem in a two-echelon retailer-led supply chain. Their focus is to compare profitability 
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under various coalition structures. Li et al. (2017) investigate different coalition strategies 
under a three-echelon reverse supply chain setting where a collector, a remanufacturer, and 
two retailers may form various coalitions. This study identifies maximal economic and social 
benefit in a centralized model, but it does not address how to divide “this bigger pie”. The 
aforesaid research indicates that non-cooperative game models are well suited to deal with 
coalition formation in supply chains and identify what potential gains may exist, but it 
remains an unsettled issue as to how surplus profit in a centralized system should be properly 
allocated to foster cooperation among members.
2.2. Applications of cooperative game approaches in supply chains
An increasing number of researchers have been applying cooperative game theoretical models 
to supply chain management (Fiestras-Janeiro et al., 2011). This body of literature can take 
two different lines of thinking, either from a cost or a profit allocation angle. 
The first stream of this literature addresses cost allocation in supply chains by using 
cooperative game theoretic models. For instance, Granot and Sošić (2003) study a 
decentralized supply chain system consisting of multiple retailers with stochastic demand. 
They examine the effect of different cost sharing rules among the retailers (e.g., Shapely value) 
on residual supply/demand. Leng and Parlar (2009) model a three-level supply chain where 
the characteristic function is obtained by computing the expected inventory cost of the three 
agents (i.e., a supplier, a manufacturer, and a retailer) in an information-sharing setting. After 
comparing different solution concepts in the cooperative game theory, they adopt the 
nucleolus solution to allocate inventory cost across the supply chain. These papers typically 
derive the characteristic function of cooperative game models by minimizing the total cost. 
       The second stream of existing research addresses profit allocation under different 
coalition structures in multi-echelon supply chains. To this end,  Jena and Sarmah (2014) first 
examine the coalition formation and the related optimal profit in different non-cooperative 
and cooperative cases in a CLSC comprising two competitive manufacturers and a retailer. 
Then, they obtain the characteristic function based on equilibrium solutions in non-
cooperative game models and develop a weighted Shapely value mechanism to distribute 
surplus profit in a fully coordinated model. Similarly, Zhang and Liu (2013) analyze coalition 
formation based on four non-cooperative models, thereby deriving the characteristic function 
for all coalitions and applying the Shapely value and asymmetric Nash negotiation to 
coordinate the supply chain system. It is worth noting that the Shapley value arises as the 
profit allocation scheme in the aforesaid two articles, but the resulting solution may not 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
7
necessarily make the grand coalition stable (Leng and Parlar, 2009). This motivates us to 
consider other allocation methods on top of the Shapley value approach such as the nucleolus 
solution (Leng and Parlar, 2009; Noori-Daryan et al., 2017). 
2.3. Supply chain coordination with fairness concerns
Another body of literature that is closely related to our research is channel coordination 
with fairness concerns. Along this line, Cui et al. (2007) incorporate fairness concerns into a 
dyadic supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer and reveal that a simple 
wholesale price contract can coordinate such a channel when the retailer or both members are 
fairness-minded. By extending the linear demand function in Cui et al. (2007) to different 
nonlinear functions in the same supply chain setting, Caliskan-Demirag et al. (2010) perform 
a comparative analysis and find that an exponential demand function is easier to achieve 
coordination than the linear demand function. Yang et al. (2013) conceive cooperative 
advertising as a strategy to improve the performance of a supply chain consisting of one 
manufacturer and one retailer. Their study shows that cooperative advertising can coordinate 
the whole channel under certain conditions if only the retailer is fair-minded. Du et al. (2014) 
incorporate the newsvendor model into a dyadic supply chain where both the supplier and the 
retailer are fairness-minded. Their findings show that the traditional wholesale price contract 
can coordinate the fairness-minded channel based on affine transformation only if the scale 
factor falls within a small interval, implying that fairness concerns make it harder for channel 
coordination. Katok and Pavlov (2013) investigate the effect of three factors, fairness 
concerns, incomplete information, and propensity to make random errors, on the inefficiency 
of coordinating a simple supply chain with a supplier and a retailer. As for CLSCs, existing 
literature has investigated the impact of the retailer’s fairness concerns on equilibrium 
decisions (Liu et al., 2017b; Ma et al., 2017). Liu et al. (2017b) further devise a revenue-
sharing contract to coordinate a two-echelon CLSC with both members’ fairness concerns. 
These studies reveal that fairness concerns make it more complicated to coordinate a supply 
chain and existing research along this line is generally confined to two-echelon supply chains 
within a non-cooperative game setting. 
Based on the key features of our models, Table 1 frames our research in a proper 
literature context. The table reveals that the majority of extant literature concentrates on the 
coordination of supply chains in different two-echelon settings. Limited attention is dedicated 
to coordination by cooperative game approaches in multi-echelon CLSC settings. The focus 
of this paper differs from existing studies as it investigates the impact of R’s fairness concerns 
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on the coordination results in a three-echelon CLSC by employing three cooperative game 
approaches.












Hasanov et al. (2018) Y Y N N N
Taleizadeh et al. (2015) Y Y N N N
Taleizadeh and Noori-
daryan (2015)
Y Y N N N
Zerang et al. (2018) Y Y N N N
Alamdar et al. (2018) Y Y N N N
Zhou et al. (2016) Y Y N N N
Taleizadeh et al. 
(2017a)
Y Y N N N
Taleizadeh et al. 
(2018a)
Y Y N N N
Heydari et al. (2017) Y N N N N
Xie et al. (2017) Y N N N N
Taleizadeh et al. 
(2018a)
Y Y N N N
Alamdar et al. (2018) Y Y Y N N
Zhang and Ren (2016) Y Y Y N N
Saha et al. (2016) Y Y N N N
Ma et al. (2016) Y Y Y N N
Taleizadeh et al. 
(2017b)
Y Y Y N N
Li et al. (2017) Y Y Y N N
Granot and Sošić 
(2003)
N N Y N Y
Leng and Parlar (2009) N Y Y N Y
Jena and Sarmah 
(2014)
Y N Y N Y
Zhang and Liu (2013) N Y Y N Y
Noori-Daryan et al. 
(2017)
N Y Y N Y
Cui et al. (2007) N N N Y N
Caliskan-Demirag et al. 
(2010)
N N N Y N
Yang et al. (2013) N N N Y N
Du et al. (2014) N N N Y N
Katok and Pavlov 
(2013)
N N N Y N
Liu et al. (2017b) Y N N Y N
Ma et al. (2017) Y Y N Y N
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This research Y Y Y Y Y
More specifically, our paper is closely related to the studies conducted by Jena and 
Sarmah (2014) and Zhang and Liu (2013). The former applies cooperative games to CLSC 
coordination in a two-echelon setting with two competitive manufactures, but our game 
theoretic models are put in a three-echelon CLSC framework. On the other hand, while Zhang 
and Liu (2013) investigate a three-echelon green supply chain, their research does not account 
for remanufacturing or fairness concerns as we have considered in this paper. Moreover, Jena 
and Sarmah (2014) and Zhang and Liu (2013) only introduce one cooperative game model, 
the Shapley value approach, to coordinate their supply chains, but we put forward two 
additional cooperative game approaches to coordinate the CLSC. 
Next, we present our model settings and assumptions.
3. Problem description
We consider a three-echelon CLSC consisting of a manufacturer (M), a distributor (D), and a 
fairness-minded retailer (R). To make the presentation gender-neutral, we hereafter refer to M 
as him, D as her, and R as it. In a decentralized setting, M produces new products, collects 
used products from the marketplace, and is responsible for remanufacturing. D then procures 
new and remanufactured products from M and wholesales them to R. R subsequently retails 
the products to the end market. In this decentralized model, M is modelled as the leader, 
followed by D, and lastly by R. Given R’s relatively weaker position in this setting and 
consistent with the general observation that agents at disadvantage are often concerned with 
fairness (Ho and Su, 2009; Ho et al., 2014), we assume that R has distribution fairness 
concerns with its upstream partner D. Our key concern is to coordinate this three-echelon 
CLSC with R’s fairness concerns by resorting to the cooperative game theory. 
To derive the characteristic function form of the cooperative game, we need to examine 
all possible coalitions and their related equilibriums. Given the specific supply chain structure, 
we assume that D has an irreplaceable position in the CLSC so that M and R cannot skip her 
to form a coalition. With this assumption, four models are considered as shown in Fig. 1: a 
centralized model CC where a central planner makes all decisions, a decentralized model CD 
where each member makes his/her/its own decisions sequentially from M, to D, and to R, and 
two partially cooperative models MD and DR where two partial coalitions MD and DR are 
formed and make centralized decisions within the respective coalition. In the MD (DR) model, 
the partial coalition MD (DR) is treated as a new unified decision agent and the CLSC is 
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essentially reduced to a two-echelon one. Under this setting, the partial coalition MD (DR) is 
modelled as the leader (follower) and the other partner R (M) is the follower (leader). Here, 
Models CC and CD, respectively, serve as top-line and bottom-line benchmark cases. 
In this research, we assume that R’s fairness concerns are reflected as an aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality relative to its immediate upstream partner (Ho and Su, 2009). 
Given this assumption, it is understandable that R’s fairness concerns become irrelevant in 
Models CC and DR as there will be no financial transactions (and, hence, distribution 
inequality) between D and R. But in Models CD and MD, R shows fairness concerns with D 
and MD, respectively. As such, when R is an independent agent, it is fairness-minded and its 
objective is to maximize its utility and other agents (individual members or coalitions) aim at 
profit maximization. If R joins coalition DR or the grand coalition T, fairness concerns 
become irrelevant and all agents (members or coalitions) seek to maximize their profits. 
Given the aforementioned model settings, we first derive equilibrium pricing, resulting 
quantities, and profits under the four models, CC, CD, MD, and DR. Then, the characteristic 
function form of the cooperative game is obtained based on the equilibrium results. 
Subsequently, three coordination mechanisms based on the cooperative game theory are 
proposed to allocate surplus profit among the three CLSC members. We then carry out 
numerical experiments to compare and evaluate the performance of the three coordination 













































































(a) Model CC                        (b) Model CD                            (c) Model MD                     (d) Model DR
Fig.1. The non-cooperative and cooperative models of the three-echelon CLSC
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4. Notation and assumptions
It is assumed that new and remanufactured products coexist in the same market (Souza, 2013; 
Xiong et al., 2013). Based on the problem description, we employ the following symbols and 
notation throughout this paper:
Table 2. Parameters and decision variables
Symbol Definition
/nc rc Unit production cost of new/remanufactured products
/nm rm Unit wholesale price of new/remanufactured products charged by M to D
/nw rw Unit wholesale price of new/remanufactured products paid charged by D to R
/np rp Unit retail price of new/ remanufactured products
/nq rq Production quantity of new/remanufactured products
A Unit exogenous cost of recycling a used product
 Consumer value discount for remanufactured products
 Consumer’s willingness-to-pay for new products
 R’s fairness concern parameter, where  measures R’s disutility of earning less than D0 
i
j
Profit function of coalition  in model ,  and j = T (Model CC); M, j i { , , , }i CC CD MD DR
D, R (Model CD); MD, R (Model MD); M, DR (Model DR), where is the grand coalition.T
( )i
j
 The new or remanufactured product profit, where  and { , }n r  ( ) ( )i n i r ij j j   
h
Ru R’s fairness utility in model , h { , }h CD MD
To make the analysis tractable, we make the following assumptions in this research.
Assumption 1. Problem dynamics are captured in a steady one-period model.
This paper considers one-period interactions among CLSC members (Liu et al. (2017a). 
This assumption is consistent with existing research and has been widely used in literature 
(Örsdemir et al., 2014; Xiong et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2015; Zou et al., 2016). This assumption 
allows us to focus on the impact of R’s fairness concerns on the CLSC members’ pricing 
decisions and profit allocation schemes. We also assume that there exist plenty of used 
products for remanufacturing  (Ma et al., 2017; Zou et al., 2016).
Assumption 2. Consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness-to-pay for a new product , 
which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a 
remanufactured product is a fraction  of , where .  [0,1) 
The utilities that a consumer receives from new and remanufactured products are 
 and , respectively. Following the utility maximization principle, ( )n nu p   ( )r ru p  
if , consumers will purchase the new product, resulting in a new product max{ ,0}n ru u
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max{ ,0}r nu u
remanufactured product, leading to a remanufactured product demand function 
  









Assumption 3. A remanufactured product is cheaper to produce, i.e., . 0 1r nc c  
Due to recycling of used parts and components, remanufacturing is typically less 
expensive than producing a new product, i.e.  (Ma et al., 2016; Zou et al., 2016). 0 r nc c 
As consumers’ maximum willingness-to-pay for new products is normalized to 1, the unit 
production cost  must satisfy  to ensure positive demand for new products (Liu et al., nc 1nc 
2017a)  
Assumption 4. To ensure profitable remanufacturing, it is assumed that . + r nA c c
This assumption  allows M to enjoy a cost advantage so that he has an + r nA c c
incentive to engage in recycling and remanufacturing (Atasu et al., 2008; Souza, 2013), and 
offers both new and remanufactured products. If , it is not economically viable for + r nA c c
M to offer remanufactured products.  
Assumption 5. D has an irreplaceable distribution channel so that M cannot form a coalition 
with R without D’s participation.
This assumption is consistent with Leng and Parlar (2009) and Zhang and Liu (2013), 
where the midstream member in the supply chain is assumed indispensable. 
Assumption 6. Only R has fairness concerns with its immediate upstream decision-maker 
(individual D or coalition MD). R has no fairness concerns with M directly and the concern 
level stays constant regardless of the upstream member being an individual or a coalition. The 
other members are fairness-neutral. This assumption is consistent with the general observation 
that agents at a disadvantageous position are usually concerned with fairness (Ho and Su, 
2009; Ho et al., 2014). As R is a follower in our model setting and has a relatively weaker 
position in a CLSC, it is thus modelled to be the fairness-minded member in this research 
(Chen et al., 2017a).  
5. The equilibrium analysis
Next, we derive the equilibrium results for the four base models, CC, CD, MD and DR.
5.1. The centralized model (Model CC)
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We first consider the top-line benchmark case in which a centralized planner makes decisions 
for all CLSC members to maximize the system profit (see Fig. 1(a)). In this case, no financial 
transactions will be occurred between M and D or D and R, and the central planner sells to the 
end market directly. The channel profit function is formulated as:
.
,
max ( ) ( )
n r
CC
T n n n r r rp p
p c q p c A q      (1)
Eq. (1) characterizes the CLSC channel profit as two components: the profit from new 
and remanufactured products. The central planner makes the retail pricing decisions for the 
two types of products to maximize the channel profit. 
By first-order conditions, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. In the centralized model, the optimal selling prices, the resulting sales 
quantities of new and remanufactured products, and the channel profit are given as: 












c c Aq 














* (1 ) ( )
4 4 (1 )
n nC
T
rC c c A c 
 
   


Proof. See Appendix A.
For notational convenience, let 
 
and it is apparent that 
2 2(1 ) ( )
4 4 (1 )






. Then, we rewrite , where . Without causing confusion, we 0K  * *CC CCT T K 
* 1CCT 
hereafter shall refer to profit coefficient  as j’s profit in model i,  , *ij { , , , }i CC CD MD DR
.{ , , , , , }j M D R MD DR T
5.2. The decentralized model (Model CD)
In this model (see Fig. 1(b)), M and D are assumed to be fairness neutral while R has 
distributional fairness concerns with D. R cares about not only its own profit but also its profit 
relative to that of D. Therefore, R’s utility function is given as
,( )CD CD CD CDR R D Ru      (2)
where  is R’s fairness concern parameter: the larger the  , the more the R is concerned 0  
with distributional fairness (Chen et al., 2017a). Eq. (2) accounts for R’s profit and disutility 
of its getting less profit than its upstream partner D. A more general model of fairness 
concerns considers both aversions to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality (e.g., Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999); Charness and Rabin (2002); Cui et al. (2007)). However, it has been 
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revealed that aversion to advantageous inequality is not as common as that to disadvantageous 
inequality (Loewenstein et al., 1989).  Ho and Su (2009)’s experiment even notes the absence 
of this aversion. As such, our research here follows this line of research by assuming that R’s 
fairness concern is uni-directional. A large body of literature has adopted this idea and 
introduced similar utility functions with only disadvantageous inequality (Bolton, 1991; Chen 
et al., 2017; Ho et al., 2014; Nie and Du, 2017). 
In this case, M and D maximize their profit while R pursues its utility maximization. The 
decision sequence is as follows: M first determines  and  for D to pay; then D sets  nm rm nw
and  for R to pay; finally, R decides its retail prices  and  and sells the products to rw np rp




















CD CD CD CD
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where . Eq. (3) characterizes the Stakelberg game for Model ( ) ( )n n n r r r
CD
R p w q p w q   
CD, where M moves first, followed by D, and then R. Here, M and D maximize their profits 
from new and remanufactured products and R maximizes its fairness-concerned utility, and 
decision variables are the wholesale and retail prices. This decentralized model is referred to 
as the Non-Cooperative Mechanism (NCM) and serves as a bottom-line benchmark for our 
comparative studies in Section 7. The following proposition furnishes the equilibrium result 
for this case.























c A cw A  













c Ap  




c c Aq 
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D D K 
* *CD CD
R R K 
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Proof. The proof is furnished in Appendix B.
5.3. M and D form a coalition (MD)
In this model (see Fig. 1(c)), M and D form a coalition and are treated as a new decision-
maker who decides  and . Subsequently, R sets its retail price  and . Similarly, nw rw np rp
coalition MD is assumed to be fairness-neutral, and R has fairness concerns with its relative 
profit distribution with coalition MD. Similar to , R’s utility function in Model MD can be CDRu
stated as 
,( )MD MD MD MDR R MD Ru     
where  is R’s fairness concern level which is the same as that in Eq. (2) as per Assumption 
6. In this case, coalition MD and R constitute a two-echelon Stackelberg game model where 
MD aims to maximize the profit of the coalition and R maximizes its utility . Similarly, MDRu
as coalition MD works as a new decision-maker, there will be no financial transactions 




max ( ( ))





MD MD MD MD
R R MD Rp

















where . In this model, coalition MD is pooled together by two ( ) ( )n n n r r r
MD
R p w q p w q   
independent members M and D, so MD incurs the same production costs for the new and 
remanufactured products as M. Furthermore, due to this alliance between M and D, the 
pricing competition between these two members disappears. Instead, they make joint 
decisions ( ) as an integrated agent to compete with the downstream member R. Given ,n rw w
the optimal decisions and profit of MD, R shows fairness concerns and makes decisions to 
maximize its fairness utility. 
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium result.
Proposition 3. In Model MD, the equilibrium prices are given as 
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 * *MD MDMD MD K 
* *MD MD
R R K 























Proof. The proof is included in Appendix C.
5.4. D and R form a coalition (DR)
In this model (as shown in Fig. 1(d)), D and R form a coalition. There will be no financial 
transactions between D and R, and as a result, there will be no profit distribution between D 
and R within this coalition, making R’s fairness concerns irrelevant in this case. The coalition 







( ) ( )







n n n r r r
n n np p r r r
m c q m c A q





   
  
(5)
In this setting, as R and D form a coalition and work together as a collective entity, this 
alliance removes the competition between D and R as well as R’s fairness concerns. M makes 
the same pricing decisions as he does in Model D, and the coalition DR makes joint pricing 
decisions ( ) to the final customers. The three-echelon decentralized model CD, is ,n rp p
transformed into a two-echelon supply chain with M as the Stackelberg leader and coalition 
DR as the follower, and both maximize their respective profit. 
This game is solved by backward induction and the equilibrium result is presented in 
Proposition 4.
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 * *DR DRM M K 
, and , where , , and .* *DR DRDR DR K 
* *DR DR













Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D.
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5.5. Comparative analysis of equilibrium results
By comparing the equilibrium results in Propositions 1-4, the following conclusions can be 
drawn.
Proposition 5. The wholesale prices of the new and remanufactured products in the three 
decentralized and partial-coalition models satisfy:











{ , }i CD DR



















Proof. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Proposition 5(1) shows that M’s wholesale prices of new and remanufactured products in 
Model DR are the same as those in Model CD. This is understandable: From M’s perspective, 
he only marks up the wholesale prices once regardless of the downstream partner being a 
single member D or a coalition DR. Therefore, we have  and . In * *CD DRn nm m
* *CD DR
r rm m
addition, given that R only has fairness concerns with respect to D rather than M in Model CD 
(See Assumption 6) and it has no fairness concerns when it forms a coalition with D in Model 
DR, it is natural that M’s wholesale pricing decisions are independent of R’s fairness concern 









{ , }i CD DR
Proposition 5(2) shows that the wholesale prices of new and remanufactured products 
charged by coalition MD are lower than those set by member D. This result is due to the 
cooperative strategy in Model MD that effectively eliminates the double marginalization 
between M and D, thereby allowing MD to charge lower wholesale prices while still 
enhancing the channel profit. Moreover, Proposition 5(2) demonstrates that the wholesale 
prices charged to R decrease in R’s fairness concern parameter . This is natural as the more 
the R is concerned with distributional fairness, the more profit its upstream partner D or MD 






































coalition MD has much more room to lower the wholesale prices  than D can reduce ,MD MDn rw w
her wholesale prices  for the new and remanufactured products. ,CD CDn rw w
Proposition 6. The retail prices of new and remanufactured products in the four models 
satisfy:

















{ , , , }i CC CD MD DR
(2) , ;* *i ir np p { , , , }i CC CD MD DR
(3)  and .* * * *CC MD DR CDn n n np p p p  
* * * *CC MD DR CD
r r r rp p p p  
Proof. The proof is furnished in Appendix F.
Proposition 6(1) shows that R’s fairness concerns do not affect the retail prices of new 
and remanufactured products in the four models. This is natural for Models CC and DR as R 
has no fairness concerns given that it cooperates with its upstream partner D in these two 
cases. For the other two models, CD and MD, in anticipation of R’s fairness concerns, the 
upstream partner (member D or coalition MD) lowers the wholesale prices of new and 
remanufactured products to give up some profit margins (See Proposition 5), thereby allowing 
R to hold the retail prices steady and rake in more profit. 
Proposition 6(2) concludes that the retail price of the remanufactured product is always 
lower than that of the new product in each of the four models. This is clear given that 
consumers have a lower willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products. 
Proposition 6(3) compares the retail prices of new and remanufactured products across 
the four models. For both retail prices, the same relationship holds: Model CC has the lowest, 
Model CD has the highest, and Models MD and DR have the same value in the middle. This 
is due to the fact that Model CD has two mark-ups, first by M and then by D, Models MD and 
DR each has only one mark-up, and Model CC completely eliminates double marginalization. 
The different double-marginalization scenarios lead to distinct retail prices. 
Proposition 7. The sale quantities of new and remanufactured products in the four models 
satisfy:

















{ , , , }i CC CD MD DR
(2)  if ; otherwise, , ;* 0inq  1 r nA c c    
* 0inq  { , , , }i CC CD MD DR
(3)  if ; otherwise, , ;* *i in rq q     2 11 r nA c c      * *i in rq q { , , , }i CC CD MD DR
(4) If ,  and .1 r nA c c    
* * * *CD MD DR CC
n n n nq q q q  
* * * *CD MD DR CC
r r r rq q q q  
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Proof. The proof is furnished in Appendix G.
Proposition 7(1) shows that R’s fairness concerns have no impact on the sale quantities 
of the new and remanufactured products in the four models. This result is in parallel with 
Proposition 6(1) where R’s fairness concerns do not affect the retail prices of these two 
products.
Proposition 7(2) indicates that positive demand for new products exists if and only if 
. Otherwise, only remanufactured products will be offered by the CLSC. 1 r nA c c    
Proposition 7(3) shows that a threshold  exists such that     2 11 r nA c c     
the sale quantity of new products is larger than that of the remanufactured products for the 
four models. It is worth noting that whether the quantity of remanufactured products exceeds 
that of new products depends on the structural parameters (i.e., , ,  and ) rather than  A nc rc
the fairness concern parameter (i.e., ). This is understandable as fairness concerns have no 
impact on the sale quantities of new and remanufactured products.
Proposition 7(4) compares the sale quantities of new and remanufactured products across 
the four models. We can observe that the sale quantities of these four models satisfy 
 and , corresponding to the relationships * * * *CD MD DR CCn n n nq q q q  
* * * *CD MD DR CC
r r r rq q q q  
of the retail prices among the four models in Proposition 6(3),  and * * * *CC MD DR CDn n n np p p p  
. Given that the sale quantity depends on the retail price, the lower * * * *CC MD DR CDr r r rp p p p  
the retailer price, the higher the sale quantity. Therefore, we have the highest sale quantity 
under Model CC, the lowest under Model CD, and the same middle value in Models MR and 
DR. 
Proposition 8.  The profits under the four models satisfy:
(1) ;* * * *CD DR MD CCT T T T     









(3)  and ;* *DR CDM M 
* * *DR CD CD
DR D R   
(4) ; If , , otherwise, ; * *MD CDR R  0 1 
* * *MD CD CD
MD M D   
* * *MD CD CD










Proof. The proof is furnished in Appendix H.
Proposition 8(1) clearly illustrates that double marginalization plays a significant role in 
channel profitability across the four models. Without it in Model CC, the profit attains the 
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highest level; for the two partial-coalition models MD and DR, each is affected once with the 
same profit in the middle; Model CD achieves the lowest level since it is impacted twice. 
For the decentralized model CD, Proposition 8(2) shows that M’s profit stays constant at 
0.25 and the total profit of D and R is always 0.1875. The relative profit distribution reflects 
M’s leadership position in this CLSC model. In addition, when R’s fairness concern level 
increases with a larger , it is understandable that D gives up more of her profit to appease R, 
leading to a higher profit for R and a lower profit for D. Proposition 8(2) further reveals that 
R’s profit increases and D’s profit decreases at the same rate when  increases, resulting in a 
constant total profit for D and R. This result attests that R’s fairness concerns serve as a profit 
redistribution mechanism between R and its immediate upstream partner D. 
Compared to Model CD, Proposition 8(3) demonstrates that M’s profit is enhanced when 
D and R form a coalition. This can be deduced by examining Propositions 5 and 7: 
Proposition 5(1) confirms that M’s wholesale prices of new and remanufactured products in 
Model DR are the same as those in Model CD, and Proposition 7(4) indicates higher market 
demand for new (if any) and remanufactured products in Model DR than that in Model CD. 
Therefore, we have . Coalition DR achieves a higher profit than the total profit of * *DR CDM M 
D and R when they act independently in Model CD thanks to the elimination of double 
marginalization between D and R in Model DR as well as R’s non-economic fairness 
concerns in Model CD. 
When M and D form a coalition, Proposition 8(4) indicates that R attains a higher profit 
than that in Model CD regardless of the value of . It can be verified that R’s unit profit 
margins of new and remanufactured products are both higher in Model MD than those in 
Model CD. Proposition 7(4) points out that the market demand for new (if any) and 
remanufactured products is higher in Model MD than that in Model CD. As such, R’s profit in 
MD is higher than that in CD. For coalition MD, it is more complicated. Proposition 5(2) 
signifies that the coalition gives up more profit margin to R than member D does in Model 
CD. For smaller , this extra concession does not hurt the coalition in the sense that (0,1) 
both M and D are better off by cooperating than by acting independently. However, if R’s 
fairness concerns are excessive (i.e., ), coalition MD becomes unstable as it is better off 1 
to dissolve the coalition by working on their own (i.e.,  if  where * * *MD CD CDMD M D    1 











Proposition 8(2) and  serves as a profit redistribution vehicle between R and its upstream 
partner MD, which is a coalition here instead of an individual member D in Model CD. 
Proposition 9.  The optimal profits and sale quantities of new and remanufactured products 
under the four models satisfy:
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1
n r nc A c c

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    

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   

 { , , , }i CC CD MD DR
and j corresponds to the relevant coalition(s) in a particular model i, where the coalition can 
be an individual member M, D, or R, a partial coalition MD or DR, or the grand coalition T;
















{ , , , }i CC CD MD DR
Proof. The proof is furnished in Appendix I.
        Proposition 9 clearly shows that the ratio of the profit contribution from new products to 
that from remanufactured products is independent of R’s fairness concern parameter and 










is natural for models CC and DR where R’s fairness concerns are irrelevant, the impact of R’s 
concerns on the ratio of the profit contribution from new products to that from 
remanufactured products is exactly cancelled out for each coalition involved in models CD 
and MD. As for sales quantities of new and remanufactured products, Proposition 7(1) clearly 
shows that they are both independent of R’s fairness concern and, hence, the ratio 

















Proposition 10. By examining the equilibrium solutions and profits in Models CD and MD 
when  with those when , one obtains the following result:0  0 
(1) , , , ;* *
0 0
CD CD












r rw w  

























Proof. The proof is given in Appendix J.
Propositions 5-8 indicate that R’s fairness concerns only affect the wholesale prices and 
related profit distributions under Models CD and MD. Proposition 10(1) shows that the 
upstream member D or coalition MD always offers lower wholesale prices for new and 
remanufactured products when R is fairness-minded compared to the case when R is fairness-
neutral. Proposition 10(2) is natural as R’s fairness concerns lead D in Model CD and MD in 
Model MD to transfer more of their profits to R. As such, fairness-minded R rakes in more 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
22
profit than a fairness-neutral R at the expense of member D in Model CD and coalition MD in 
Model MD.
From Propositions 5-10, we conclude that R’s fairness concerns do not affect the retail 
prices and sale quantities of the new and remanufactured products under the four models, 
leading to constant quantity and individual profit ratios of new to remanufactured products. 
R’s fairness concerns serve as a profit redistribution tool between R and its immediate 
upstream partner D in Model CD and DR in Model DR but do not affect the total channel 
profit. We can also conclude that cooperation enhances channel profit, and the more 
cooperative the CLSC members are, the higher the channel profit. However, it remains 
unsettled how the resulting surplus profit should be allocated among the supply chain 
members. Next, we shall resort to the cooperative game theory to address this issue.
6. Cooperative game theoretic coordination mechanisms for CLSCs with 
R’s fairness concerns 
In this section, the cooperative game theory is employed to address fair allocation of surplus 
profit among the three CLSC members. This research defines fair allocation from both 
individual and collective rationality angles: A fair allocation scheme must enhance each 
member’s individual profitability and collectively attain the maximum channel profit in the 
centralized case.
6.1. The characteristic function form of the cooperative game
A characteristic-function game is a pair  consisting of a set of n players  [ , ]N v {1,2, , }N n 
and a characteristic function , mapping every coalition  to a value  (Schmeidler, v S N ( )v S
1969). Given our CLSC setting, a cooperative game  is established in the characteristic-[ , ]N v
function form in which  represents the three CLSC members. Now we { , , }N M D R
compute the characteristic values of all possible coalitions, , , , , ( )v  ( )v M ( )v D ( )v R
, , , and . According to the cooperative game theory, the ( )v MD ( )v MR ( )v DR ( )v MDR
characteristic value of a coalition is the minimum profit that it can gain based solely on its 
own effort (Leng and Parlar, 2009). In other words, the characteristic value of a coalition 
represents its bottom line and reflects its bargaining power in the cooperative game. Taking 
R’s characteristic value  as an example. R’s profits in Models CD and MD are  ( )v R *CDR K





analysis as it clearly indicates the profit allocation ratio for different coalitions as a fraction of 
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the channel profit in the centralized case. As per Leng and Parlar (2009) and Nagarajan and 
Sošić (2008), the characteristic value is calculated as .  Similar * * *( ) min{ , }CD MD CDR R Rv R    
to , other characteristic values are obtained as shown in Table 3. Note that the ( )v R
characteristic value of an empty coalition is naturally zero,  and thus omitted here. ( ) 0v  
The value of coalition MR is zero owing to Assumption 5. 
Table 3. The characteristic function of the cooperative game with R’s fairness concerns
Coalition ( )M ( )D ( )R ( )MD ( )MR ( )DR ( )MDR




































6.2. Core guaranteed allocation mechanisms
Proposition 8 indicates that the channel achieves the maximum profit K when the three CLSC 
members form the grand coalition in the centralized model. We aim to find a stable allocation 
scheme so that all members are better off if they are willing to coordinate their decisions. 
Since the characteristic values in Table 3 are furnished as profit coefficients, we denote , Mx
, and  as the allocated profit coefficients to M, D, and R, respectively. A triple Dx Rx
 is called suitable if it satisfies the following two properties:( , , )M D Rx x x
(1) Individual rationality: , , and ;( )Mx v M ( )Dx v D ( )Rx v R
(2) Collective rationality: .( )M D Rx x x v MDR  
A triple  =  satisfying the aforesaid properties is called an imputation of ( )x   , ,M D Rx x x
the cooperative game (Straffin (1993), and the set containing all nondominated imputations is 
denoted by . To obtain and analyze a unique allocation scheme, Gillies (1959) introduces ( )I 
the core of an n-person cooperative game in the characteristic-function form as 
. In the context of our research, this formula ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for all i
i S
C v x v I v x v v S S N

 
    
 

can be rewritten as , , , , , ( )Mx v M ( )Dx v D ( )Rx v R  M Dx x v MD   M Rx x v MR 
and . D Rx x v DR 
If the core is nonempty, its implied allocation scheme makes the grand coalition stable as 
no member is willing to leave the coalition unilaterally. Next, we shall propose three different 




Next, three cooperative game mechanisms are proposed to allocate surplus profit due to 
cooperation among the three members. For notational convenience, denote   as member j’s ijx
allocated profit coefficient under mechanism i, i = SVM (Shapley value mechanism), NSM 
(nucleolus solution mechanism), ESM (equal satisfaction mechanism); j = M, D, R.
6.3. The Shapley Value Mechanism (SVM)
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a widely accepted profit allocation mechanism in 
cooperative games, which is simply the average marginal contribution of each player if this 
player enters all possible coalitions in a completely random order. Given the cooperative 
game , , the Shapley value of each CLSC member is determined as[ , ]N v { , , }N M D R
,
,
( )[ ( ) ( \ )], , ,SVMj
j S S N
x w S v S v S j j M D R
 
   (6)
where  is the characteristic value of the coalition formed by all members in  except ( \ )v S j S








the weight factor. It is worth noting that the Shapley value may not be in the core and will 
thus make the grand coalition unstable. Therefore, the objective of SVM is not only to derive 
the Shapely value but also to investigate whether it is in the core.
6.4. The Nucleolus Solution Mechanism (NSM)
Now we present the nucleolus solution concept that aims to minimize the largest degree of 
dissatisfaction of an allocation scheme (Schmeidler, 1969). By applying it to our cooperative 
game , we calculate the nucleolus solution as follows:[ , ]N v
.min  (7)
,





NSM NSM NSM C
M D R T






   

   

(8)
where  can be treated as the “unhappiness” of the unhappiest player  (Leng and Parlar, 
2009). This linear programming model can be solved iteratively to find the nucleolus solution 
of the problem. It is noted that the nucleolus is always in the core if it exists.
6.5. The Equal Satisfaction Mechanism (ESM)
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If a central planner wishes to encourage supply chain members to cooperate and form the 
grand coalition, one possible mechanism is to equalize their satisfaction by properly allocating 
the profit. Loosely speaking, satisfaction is defined as the ratio of the allocated profit to the 
ideal income. More specifically, denote member j’s ideal income by , which is calculated jr
by (Dai and Chen, 2012)
.( ) ( \ )jr v MDR v MDR j  (9)
Then, given member ’s allocated profit , its satisfaction can be defined asj jx
.j j js x r (10)
Understandably, the ideal income  is usually unattainable, but it furnishes an upper jr
bound for the allocated profit for player  and it is reasonable for the player to expect a j
dividend of (Tijs, 1987). It is apparent that the higher the , the more satisfied the ( )v MDR js
player is with the allocated profit. 
Following the idea in Frisk et al. (2010)’s Equal Profit Method, we propose a new profit 
allocation mechanism that minimizes the maximum pairwise satisfaction difference, which is 
referred to as the Equal Satisfaction Mechanism (ESM). Given the cooperative game in the 
characteristic-function form , the ESM is formulated as the following linear program:[ , ]N v
min f (11)
Subject to ,  , , ,  and g hf s s g h M D R g h     (12)
( ),ESMh
h S








( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))ESM ESM ESMR D Rx x x v R v D v R      (15)
, ,0ESMhx  , ,h M D R (16)
Constraint (12) measures pairwise satisfaction differences between any two members, 
which allows the objective function  to minimize the largest satisfaction difference. f
Constraints (13) and (14) ensure that the optimal allocation is in the core. Constraint (15) 
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guarantees that R’s utility under ESM is no less than that under NCM. Therefore, the ESM 
allocation scheme aims to equalize all members’ satisfaction while securing individual 
rationality, stability of the grand coalition, and improved utility for R.
7. Numerical experiment and comparative studies
In this section, by setting , we first illustrate the solution process of profit allocation 0.9 
under the three coordination mechanisms presented in Section 6. Then, detailed comparative 
studies are carried out to examine how R’s fairness concern parameter  affects profit 
allocations among the three CLSC members and R’s utility under the three coordination 
mechanisms. This comparison sheds insights on the advantages and disadvantages of the three 
coordination mechanisms from different angles.
7.1. Solution process of profit allocations under the three coordination mechanisms
To obtain profit allocation schemes under the three coordination mechanisms in Section 6, we 
first set R’s fairness concern parameter at . By plugging this value into the 0.9 
characteristic function in Table 3, we have
Table 4. The characteristic values when  0.9 
Coalition ( )M ( )D ( )R ( )MD ( )MR ( )DR ( )MDR
 v S *CDM *CDD *CDR *MDMD 0 *DRDR *CCT
Value 0.25 0.0848 0.1027 0.3393 0 0.25 1
The next step is to check if the core of this game is empty (see Section 6.2 for more 
details). The core of this three-player game is computed by the toolbox TUGlab (Mirás Calvo, 
2006) and graphically illustrated in the barycentric coordinates as shown in Fig. 2, where the 
nonempty core is specified as the shaded area.
The third step is to calculate the profit allocation schemes under the three coordination 
mechanisms. Given the characteristic values in Table 4, the following calculations can be 
carried out.
(1) By solving Eq. (6), we can obtain the allocation scheme under SVM as 





(2) By solving the linear program given by (7) and (8), we derive the allocation scheme 





(3) From Eq. (9), the ideal profit allocation coefficients are determined for the three 
members as , , and . Subsequently, the allocation scheme under 0.75Mr  1Dr  0.6607Rr 
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ESM is derived by solving the linear program given in (11)-(16) as , 0.3111ESMMx 
, and .0.4148ESMDx  0.2741
ESM
Rx 
It is clear from Section 6.4 and 6.5 that the allocation schemes from NSM and ESM are 
automatically in the core if existent. The aforesaid calculations confirm their existence. So, 
our final step is to examine whether the SVM solution falls within the core as it is well known 
that the SVM always has a solution, but it is not necessarily in the core. Fig. 2 clearly shows 
that the allocation solutions under SVM, NSM and ESM are all located in the core. This 






Fig. 2. Core and the solutions under the three coordination mechanisms ( )0.9 
7.2. Comparative studies: profit allocations and R’s utility under the three coordination 
mechanisms
Fig. 2 in Section 7.1 confirms that, at  the solutions from the three coordination 0.9, 
mechanisms all fall within the core and, hence, result in unique profit allocation schemes for 
the three CLSC members. In this section, by changing the fairness concern parameter  from 
0 to 5 in increment of 0.2, we carry out extensive comparative studies to assess the 
performance of the three coordination mechanisms relative to the benchmark case NCM from 
two aspects: profit allocations and R’s utility. Our numerical studies verify that the 
characteristic functions for these  values all have non-empty cores and the corresponding 
profit allocation schemes are enforceable as they fall within the core and make the grand 
coalition stable. 
7.2.1. Comparison of profit allocations under the three coordination mechanisms
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Table 5 lists the profit allocation results for the three members at different values of  under 
the three cooperative mechanisms and the benchmark noncooperative case NCM, which can 
be graphically illustrated in Fig. 3. This figure visually compares the profit allocation between 
each of the three coordination mechanisms and the NCM, where the solid lines show the 
results for the coordination mechanisms and dashed lines are for the NCM. In addition, the 
black, blue, and red lines signify the profits for M, D, and R, respectively. Fig. 3(a) compares 
the individual profits between the SVM and NCM, Fig. 3(b) illustrates the difference in profit 
allocation under NSM and NCM, Fig. 3(c) and 3(d) show the differences in profits between 
NCM and ESM with and without R’s utility constraint, respectively. To differentiate the ESM 
with R’s utility constraint from that without the constraint, we hereafter refer them to as ESM 
and NESM, respectively. All the profits in these figures are shown as a fraction of K. The 
dashed lines in the four sub-figures clearly demonstrate that, under NCM, M’s profit stays 
constant as R is only concerned with distributional fairness with D, which does not affect M. 
When , R has no fairness concerns and D’s profit is higher than R’s. When  increases, 0  
R’s profit increases and D’s profit decreases. R’s and D’s profit lines insect at  = 0.5. Fig. 3 
clearly demonstrates that M, D, and R all have higher profits under the three coordination 
mechanisms compared to those under NCM. Collectively, our calculations indicate that SVM, 
NSM, and ESM with and without R’s utility constraint can fully coordinate the CLSC by 
achieving the optimal channel profit under the centralized setting. 














(a)  Individual profits under SVM and NCM














(b) Individual profits under NSM and NCM
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
29














    
(c) Individual profits under ESM and NCM














(d) Individual profits under NESM and NCM
Fig.3. Individual profit comparisons between the three coordination mechanisms and NCM
More specifically, Fig. 3(a) indicates that, under SVM, D is allocated the largest share of 
the channel profit, followed by M and, then, R. This differs from the NCM case where M 
takes the largest share due to its leadership role in the CLSC. This result is due to the 
allocation principle under SVM, which is based on the average marginal contributions of the 
three members by entertaining different coalitions. Given Assumption 5, it is impossible for 
M and R to form a coalition owing to D’s irreplaceable position in the CLSC. This is 
characterized by , which decreases M’s and R’s marginal contributions but ( ) 0v MR 
increases D’s marginal contribution. Under this assumption, D basically takes over the 
leadership role and, hence, is allocated the largest share of the total profit. Furthermore, as 
SVM is derived based on the characteristic function, the allocated profits under SVM reflect 
the general trend of the characteristic function. In NCM, it is understandable that  and ( )v D
 decrease in R’s fairness concern parameter  while  increases in . As such, ( )v MD  ( )v R 
the allocated profits for M, D, and R under SVM in Fig. 3(a) clearly follow the same pattern: 
the lines change more rapidly when  is small and get flatter when  becomes bigger. 
Fig. 3(b) demonstrates that the profit allocation under NSM resonates the trend under 
NCM: M’s profit stays constant, R’s profit increases in , while D’s profit decreases in   
and intersects R’s profit line at . Another feature is that, compared to NCM, each 0.5 
member under NSM receives an identical profit increment of  regardless of the value 0.1875K
of . This result is due to the surplus profit distribution principle under NSM, which 
iteratively minimizes the “unhappiness” of the unhappiest player. To fairly increase every 
member’s happiness under the cooperative framework, NSM evenly splits the channel profit 
increment  among M, D, and R compared to NCM. Thus, each member receives an 0.5625K
equal surplus profit of . 0.1875K
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Fig. 3(c) and 3(d) compare profit allocations between ESM and NCM, where Fig. 3(c) 
includes R’s utility constraint (15) and Fig. 3(d) drops it. Without accounting for R’s utility 
constraint (15), Fig. 3(d) shows a similar pattern of profit allocations as Fig. 3(a) for the three 
members,  , which is consistent with the relationship of the three SVM SVM SVMD M Rx x x 
members’ ideal income coefficients (i.e., ). The difference is that the equalization D M Rr r r 
of satisfactions shifts R’s profit up and M’s profit down. By incorporating R’s utility 
constraint (15) in ESM, Fig. 3(c) confirms that the same relationship  only ESM ESM ESMD M Rx x x 
holds for small enough . This result is reasonable as the basic idea of ESM is to minimize 
the satisfaction differences among the three members. When , Fig. 3(c) shows 1.08809 
that R’s profit increases and D’s and M’s profits decrease at rapid paces. Once  extends 
beyond 1.08809, R’s utility constraint (15) becomes binding, and the rate of profit change 
decreases slightly for the three members. When  further increases to , the equal  2.485 
satisfaction constraint (12) starts kicking in. The joint effect of constraints (12) and (15) 
causes D’s and R’s profits to jump down and M’s profit to jump up, helping to close the 
satisfaction gaps among the three members. Thereafter, M’s and R’s profits increase and D’s 
profit decreases in  at much slower paces. For large enough , we have    ESM ESM ESMM R Dx x x 
in Fig. 3(c), as opposed to  for all  in Fig. 3(d). In summary, Fig. 3(c) NESM NESM NESMD M Rx x x  
and Fig. 3(d) clearly show how R’s utility constraint (15) in ESM affects the surplus profit 
allocation among the three members under ESM.
These numerical studies confirm that the aforesaid three coordination mechanisms can 
fully coordinate the CLSC by achieving the optimal channel profit under the centralized case. 
In addition, Fig. 3 clearly shows that the resulting surplus profit allocation schemes can 
improve profitability for every CLSC member. As each coordination mechanism follows a 
unique principle to encourage cooperation, different CLSC members tend to gain differently 
under these three mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is further verified that these allocation 
schemes fall in the core of the cooperative game, making the grand coalition stable and 
furnishing viable options for the three members to collaborate with each other for individual 
and collective betterment. 
Table 5 also displays each member’s increased profits for different values of  under 
each coordination mechanism compared to the benchmark case NCM. Based on the results 
from this numerical experiment, one can obtain the average increased profits for the three 
members under the three coordination mechanisms as listed in the last row of Table 5 and 
graphically illustrated in Fig. 4. From Fig. 4, it is clear that, except for the case NSM when the 
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three members are equally rewarded by an equal increased profit, D and R are, on average, 
better off than M. The primary reasons are due to D’s indispensable position in this supply 
chain and R’s fairness concerns. Fig. 4 clearly shows that D, on average, achieves a higher 
profit enhancement than R does, implying that D’s irreplaceable position in the CLSC plays a 
more significant role in profit allocation than R’s fairness concerns do. On the other hand, M 
is still incentivized to join the grand coalition as his profit will also be enhanced under these 
coordination mechanisms compared to NCM.
Fig.4. Comparisons of each member’s average increased profits relative to the NCM
7.2.2. Comparison of R’s utility under the three coordination mechanisms
Fig. 5 graphically displays how R’s utility changes with its fairness concern parameter  
under the benchmark case NCM and the three coordination mechanisms.







Retailer utility of SVM Retailer utility of NSM
Retailer utility of ESM Retailer utility of NCM
Fig.5. Comparisons of R’s utilities
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Table 5. Profit allocations for the three members under NCM and the three coordination mechanisms
Manufacturer Distributor Retailer

NCM SVM IP NSM IP ESM IP NCM SVM IP NSM IP ESM IP NCM SVM IP NSM IP ESM IP
0 0.2500 0.3854 0.1354 0.4375 0.1875 0.3333 0.0833 0.1250 0.4479 0.3229 0.3125 0.1875 0.4444 0.3194 0.0625 0.1667 0.1042 0.2500 0.1875 0.2222 0.1597 
0.2 0.2500 0.3735 0.1235 0.4375 0.1875 0.3231 0.0731 0.1071 0.4271 0.3200 0.2946 0.1875 0.4308 0.3236 0.0804 0.1994 0.1190 0.2679 0.1875 0.2462 0.1658 
0.4 0.2500 0.3669 0.1169 0.4375 0.1875 0.3176 0.0676 0.0972 0.4155 0.3183 0.2847 0.1875 0.4235 0.3263 0.0903 0.2176 0.1273 0.2778 0.1875 0.2588 0.1685 
0.6 0.2500 0.3627 0.1127 0.4375 0.1875 0.3143 0.0643 0.0909 0.4081 0.3172 0.2784 0.1875 0.4190 0.3281 0.0966 0.2292 0.1326 0.2841 0.1875 0.2667 0.1701 
0.8 0.2500 0.3598 0.1098 0.4375 0.1875 0.3120 0.0620 0.0865 0.4030 0.3165 0.2740 0.1875 0.4160 0.3295 0.1010 0.2372 0.1362 0.2885 0.1875 0.2720 0.1710 
1 0.2500 0.3576 0.1076 0.4375 0.1875 0.3103 0.0603 0.0833 0.3993 0.3160 0.2708 0.1875 0.4138 0.3305 0.1042 0.2431 0.1389 0.2917 0.1875 0.2759 0.1717 
1.2 0.2500 0.3560 0.1060 0.4375 0.1875 0.3063 0.0563 0.0809 0.3964 0.3155 0.2684 0.1875 0.4084 0.3275 0.1066 0.2475 0.1409 0.2941 0.1875 0.2853 0.1787 
1.4 0.2500 0.3547 0.1047 0.4375 0.1875 0.3013 0.0513 0.0789 0.3942 0.3153 0.2664 0.1875 0.4018 0.3228 0.1086 0.2511 0.1425 0.2961 0.1875 0.2969 0.1883 
1.6 0.2500 0.3537 0.1037 0.4375 0.1875 0.2973 0.0473 0.0774 0.3924 0.3150 0.2649 0.1875 0.3963 0.3190 0.1101 0.2540 0.1439 0.2976 0.1875 0.3064 0.1963 
1.8 0.2500 0.3528 0.1028 0.4375 0.1875 0.2938 0.0438 0.0761 0.3909 0.3148 0.2636 0.1875 0.3918 0.3157 0.1114 0.2563 0.1449 0.2989 0.1875 0.3144 0.2030 
2 0.2500 0.3521 0.1021 0.4375 0.1875 0.2909 0.0409 0.0750 0.3896 0.3146 0.2625 0.1875 0.3879 0.3129 0.1125 0.2583 0.1458 0.3000 0.1875 0.3211 0.2086 
2.2 0.2500 0.3515 0.1015 0.4375 0.1875 0.2885 0.0385 0.0741 0.3885 0.3144 0.2616 0.1875 0.3846 0.3105 0.1134 0.2600 0.1466 0.3009 0.1875 0.3269 0.2135 
2.4 0.2500 0.3509 0.1009 0.4375 0.1875 0.2863 0.0363 0.0733 0.3876 0.3143 0.2608 0.1875 0.3817 0.3085 0.1142 0.2615 0.1473 0.3017 0.1875 0.3320 0.2177 
2.6 0.2500 0.3505 0.1005 0.4375 0.1875 0.3337 0.0837 0.0726 0.3868 0.3142 0.2601 0.1875 0.3506 0.2780 0.1149 0.2628 0.1479 0.3024 0.1875 0.3157 0.2008 
2.8 0.2500 0.3501 0.1001 0.4375 0.1875 0.3350 0.0850 0.0720 0.3860 0.3140 0.2595 0.1875 0.3469 0.2749 0.1155 0.2639 0.1484 0.3030 0.1875 0.3181 0.2026 
3 0.2500 0.3497 0.0997 0.4375 0.1875 0.3362 0.0862 0.0714 0.3854 0.3140 0.2589 0.1875 0.3436 0.2722 0.1161 0.2649 0.1488 0.3036 0.1875 0.3202 0.2041 
3.2 0.2500 0.3494 0.0994 0.4375 0.1875 0.3373 0.0873 0.0709 0.3849 0.3140 0.2584 0.1875 0.3407 0.2697 0.1166 0.2658 0.1492 0.3041 0.1875 0.3221 0.2055 
3.4 0.2500 0.3491 0.0991 0.4375 0.1875 0.3382 0.0882 0.0705 0.3843 0.3138 0.2580 0.1875 0.3381 0.2676 0.1170 0.2666 0.1496 0.3045 0.1875 0.3237 0.2068 
3.6 0.2500 0.3488 0.0988 0.4375 0.1875 0.3390 0.0890 0.0701 0.3839 0.3138 0.2576 0.1875 0.3357 0.2656 0.1174 0.2673 0.1499 0.3049 0.1875 0.3252 0.2079 
3.8 0.2500 0.3486 0.0986 0.4375 0.1875 0.3398 0.0898 0.0698 0.3835 0.3137 0.2573 0.1875 0.3336 0.2638 0.1177 0.2679 0.1502 0.3052 0.1875 0.3266 0.2089 
4 0.2500 0.3484 0.0984 0.4375 0.1875 0.3405 0.0905 0.0694 0.3831 0.3137 0.2569 0.1875 0.3317 0.2622 0.1181 0.2685 0.1504 0.3056 0.1875 0.3279 0.2098 
4.2 0.2500 0.3482 0.0982 0.4375 0.1875 0.3411 0.0911 0.0691 0.3828 0.3137 0.2566 0.1875 0.3299 0.2608 0.1184 0.2691 0.1507 0.3059 0.1875 0.3290 0.2106 
4.4 0.2500 0.3480 0.0980 0.4375 0.1875 0.3416 0.0916 0.0689 0.3824 0.3135 0.2564 0.1875 0.3283 0.2594 0.1186 0.2696 0.1510 0.3061 0.1875 0.3300 0.2114 
4.6 0.2500 0.3478 0.0978 0.4375 0.1875 0.3422 0.0922 0.0686 0.3821 0.3135 0.2561 0.1875 0.3269 0.2582 0.1189 0.2700 0.1511 0.3064 0.1875 0.3310 0.2121 
4.8 0.2500 0.3477 0.0977 0.4375 0.1875 0.3426 0.0926 0.0684 0.3819 0.3135 0.2559 0.1875 0.3255 0.2571 0.1191 0.2704 0.1513 0.3066 0.1875 0.3319 0.2128 
5 0.2500 0.3475 0.0975 0.4375 0.1875 0.3431 0.0931 0.0682 0.3816 0.3134 0.2557 0.1875 0.3242 0.2560 0.1193 0.2708 0.1515 0.3068 0.1875 0.3327 0.2134 
AIP 0.1043 0.1875 0.0725 0.3151 0.1875 0.2931 0.1431 0.1875 0.1969 
IP: increased profit compared to the case under NCM; AIP: Average increased profit compared to the case under NCM
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For the benchmark case NCM where the three members make their independent decisions, 
as R’s fairness concerns bring down D’s profit and bump up R’s profit, R’s utility 
understandably increases in  as shown in the increasing black line in Fig. 5. As all the three 
coordination mechanisms enhance R’s profitability to various degrees, it is natural that R’s 
utility is higher under SVM, NSM, and ESM than that under NCM when its fairness concerns 
are not too strong. As a matter of fact, given that NSM equally splits the surplus profit among 
the three members, R’s utility under NSM is simply shifted up by a constant compared to the 
NCM case, which is plotted as a parallel increasing green line in Fig. 5. Under ESM, R’s 
utility first decreases in  when it is small. At , R’s utility constraint becomes  1.08809 
binding and the blue line coincides with the black line in Fig. 5. As for SVM, D receives the 
highest profit allocation among the three members. Although R’s profit is enhanced, its 
fairness concerns drives its utility down as  increases. At , R’s utility breaks  0.746711 
even with the case in NCM. Thereafter, R’s utility suffers a loss under SVM compared to that 
under NCM. When  further increases beyond , its utility even turns negative as  2.82542 
shown in the red declining line in Fig. 5. 
Given R’s noneconomic fairness concerns, one can see that profit enhancement does not 
necessarily lead to higher utility for R under the three coordination mechanisms. From R’s 
utility perspective, NSM brings in the highest utility gain, while SVM and ESM only benefit 
R’s utility when R is not so concerned with distributional fairness. 
The analytical and numerical studies shed important managerial insights on operating the 
CLSC. Firstly, the equilibrium analysis in Section 5 confirms the conventional wisdom: With 
R’s fairness concerns, it remains true that the more cooperative the CLSC, the higher the 
channel profit. This result motivates us to consider coordinating the supply chain system from 
a cooperative game perspective instead of relying on traditionally contracting design based on 
a noncooperative framework. Secondly, the three proposed cooperative game approaches are 
viable mechanisms to coordinate the CLSC system as each offers a unique allocation scheme 
that satisfies both individual and collective rationality. As different coordination mechanisms 
benefit the three members differently, the resulting allocation schemes furnish diverse 
perspectives and can serve as sensible starting points for the supply chain partners to negotiate 
a final deal based on their relative power standing in the system. Thirdly, for the fairness-
minded R, its enhanced profit is not necessarily translated into a higher utility compared to the 
benchmark noncooperative mechanism, especially when its fairness concern level is high and 
SVM is adopted as the basis for allocating surplus profit. In this case, D should be prepared to 
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give up more profit to entice the retailer to remain in the grand coalition for the betterment of 
every member (higher profit for M and D and higher utility for R). 
8. Conclusions
Based on a three-echelon CLSC consisting of M, D, and R, this paper takes R’s fairness 
concerns into account under four scenarios: the centralized (CC), decentralized (CD), and two 
partial-coalition models (MD and DR). Equilibrium analyses are first carried out for these 
four models. Analytical results reveal that the more decentralized the supply chain system, the 
more the channel profit suffers. In Models CD and MD where R’s fairness concerns are in 
effect, the corresponding parameter  serves as a tool to redistribute the profits between R 
and its immediate upstream partner (D or MD) without affecting the relevant channel 
profitability. In addition, it is understandable that the larger the , the more the profit will be 
transferred to R. Based on the equilibrium results, the characteristic function of the 
cooperative game is derived. Subsequently, three coordination mechanisms, the Shapley value, 
nucleolus solution, and equal satisfaction are proposed to allocate surplus profit among the 
three CLSC members. Numerical studies confirm that the resulting surplus profit allocation 
schemes satisfy both individual and collective rationality and fall in the core of the 
cooperative game, thereby making the grand coalition stable and suggesting viable options to 
coordinate the CLSC system. Comparative analyses are carried out to examine how R’s 
fairness concern parameter  affects profit allocations among the three CLSC members and 
R’s resulting utility under the three coordination mechanisms. While all members achieve 
higher profits under the three coordination mechanisms compared to the decentralized case, 
numerical experiment reveals that D receives the highest profit share under SVM, M gets the 
largest profit under NSM, and the three CLSC members tend to be more equitably rewarded 
under ESM. From R’s utility perspective, its enhanced profit does not always translate into 
higher utility: While R always enjoys higher utility under NSM than that under NCM, for 
large , it tends to suffer a utility loss under SVM compared to NCM, thereby deterring the 
fairness-concerned R from joining the grand coalition.
Significant opportunities exist for future research. For instance, this paper only considers 
coordination mechanisms based on the cooperative game methods. It is well known that 
different contracting forms based on non-cooperative game models can also coordinate supply 
chains. It is a worthy topic to carry out a comparative study between these two classes of 
coordination models. In addition, this research considers a three-echelon CLSC with one 
member at each echelon. It is worthwhile to extend this research to a more complex CLSC 
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network structure with two or more members at one or more echelons. In this article, fairness 
concerns are characterized by R’s aversion to disadvantageous inequality and the other two 
members are assumed to be fairness-neutral. It would be interesting to incorporate other 
members’ fairness concerns as well as peer-induced fairness concerns (Ho et al., 2014) into 
the model and examine their impact on the supply chain operations and surplus profit 
allocation.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting the demand functions  and  into the profit function  and ( , )n n rq p p ( , )r n rq p p
CC
T
taking partial derivatives of the channel profit with respect to retail prices, we have 







































, the profit function  is thus strictly joint concave 
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in  and . This confirms that Model CC has a unique optimal solution. np rp

























, we derive the optimal decisions  and 2 ( 2 ) 0
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cp A  
optimal production quantities for new and remanufactured products as 




c c Aq 
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optimal total profit as .
2 2
* (1 ) ( )
4 4 (1 )
n r nCC
T









This proves Proposition 1. 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
In Model CD, the supply chain members make decisions independently, where M and D 
maximize their individual profit functions and R maximizes its utility function. This is 
modelled as a Stackelberg game where M first makes his wholesale price decisions mn and mr, 
then D determines her wholesale prices wn and wr, and finally, R sets its retail prices of new 
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and remanufactured products pn and pr and sells them to the end market. The backward 
induction method is used to solve this model as follows.
First, substituting demand functions  and  into R’s utility function ( , )n n rq p p ( , )r n rq p p
































and . As such, one confirms that  
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 and . Plugging them into 1 (1 2 )
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n n nw m w

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   
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
demand functions  and , we have the optimal quantities of new and ( , )n n rq p p ( , )r n rq p p
remanufactured products  
 
and  as functions of D’s wholesale prices *( , )CDn n rq w w
*( , )CDr n rq w w
wn and wr. 
Substituting 
 
and  into D’s profit function and solving the *( , )CDn n rq w w
*( , )CDr n rq w w
CD
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into demand functions  and , we can express the optimal quantities of ( , )n n rq ww ( , )r n rq w w
new and remanufactured products 
 
and  as functions of M’s *( , )CDn n rm mq
*( , )CDr n rm mq
wholesale prices mn and mr.
Substituting 
 
and  into M’s profit function  and solving the *( , )CDn n rm mq
*( , )CDr n rm mq
CD
M


























Subsequently, we determine D’s optimal wholesale prices of new and remanufactured 
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demand functions yields the quantities of new and remanufactured products as 




c c Aq 








































Proposition 2 is thus confirmed.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3
In Model MD, coalition MD and R constitute a two-echelon Stackelberg game model where 
the coalition is the leader and R the follower. Similarly, backward induction is employed to 
solve this model. 
Substituting demand functions  and  into R’s utility function and ( , )n n rq p p ( , )r n rq p p
MD
Ru
































. It is trivial to confirm that . 
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u u u










This indicates that R’s utility function  is strictly joint concave in  and  and has a 
MD
Ru np rp


















R’s optimal response functions 
 




n n nw cp w w w

   

 *( , )MDr n rp w w 
. Plugging them into the demand functions yields the optimal new ( 2 )
2(1 )
r r rw c A w  

    

and remanufactured product quantities 
 
and  as functions of the *( , )MDn n rq w w
*( , )MDr n rq w w
coalition’s wholesale prices wn and wr.
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Next, substituting  
 
and  into coalition MD’s profit function *( , )MDn n rq w w
*( , )MDr n rq w w
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 is strictly joint concave in  and  and has a unique optimal solution. By the first-MDMD nw rw
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Plugging them into R’s response functions results in the optimal retail prices of new 
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We then complete the proof of Proposition 3.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 4
In Model DR, M and coalition DR constitute a two-echelon Stackelberg game model with M 
being the leader and DR the follower. Once again, backward induction is applied to obtain 
equilibrium solutions.
Plugging demand functions  and  into coalition DR’s profit function ( , )n n rq p p ( , )r n rq p p















































































and . Accordingly, we can * , 1
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express the optimal quantities of new and remanufactured products as 
 










, )DRr n r r n







and  into M’s profit function  and taking *( , )DRn n rq m m
*( , )DRr n rq m m
DR
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One can then determine DR’s optimal retail prices of new and remanufactured products 
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Proposition 4 is thus proved.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing M’s wholesale prices of new and remanufactured products in Models CD and DR 
in Propositions 2 and 4, we can get:
, .* * 0CD DRn nm m 
* * 0CD DRr rm m 
Similarly, by examining D’s wholesale prices in Model CD and MD’s wholesale prices in 
Model MD, it is easy to see that 
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Taking partial derivatives of the optimal wholesale prices of new and remanufactured 
products with respect to R’s fairness concern parameter , we have:





























































































{ , }i CD DR
Proposition 5 is then verified.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 6
Taking partial derivatives of the retail prices of new and remanufactured products with respect 










{ , , , }i CC CD MD DR
Subtracting the retail price of the remanufactured product from that of the new product 
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Comparing the optimal retail prices of new and remanufactured products across the four 
models in Propositions 1-4, one can confirm that
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Proposition 6 is thus proved.
Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 7
Taking partial derivatives of the sale quantities of new and remanufactured products with 
respect to R’s fairness concern parameter  , it is easy to confirm that
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where . Otherwise, { , , , }i CC CD MD DR * 0inq 
Subtracting the sale quantities of remanufactured products from that of new products 
under each of the four models, it is trivial to verify that
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we have , otherwise, .* *i in rq q
* *i i
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Comparing the optimal sale quantities of new and remanufactured products across the 
four models in Propositions 1-4, we can confirm that
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implying that  if ;* * * *CD MD DR CCn n n nq q q q   1 r nA c c    

























that .* * * *CD MD DR CCr r r rq q q q  
Proposition 7 is thus proved.
Appendix H. Proof of Proposition 8
By examining the optimal channel profits under different models in Propositions 1-4, it is 
obvious that
, , and ;* * 1 0
4
CC MD
T T   
* * 0MD DRT T  
* * 5 0
16
DR CD
T T   
Taking partial derivatives of D’s and R’s optimal profits with respect to R’s fairness 




























Subtracting M’s profit under Model DR from that under Model CD, we can get:
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.* * 1 0
4
DR CD
M M   
Subtracting the total profit of D and R under Model CD from coalition DR’s profit under 




( )DR CD CDDR D R    
Subtracting R’s profit under Model CD from that under Model MD, we can get:









Subtracting coalition MD’s profit under Model MD from the total profit of M and D under 
Model CD, we obtain
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Taking partial derivatives of MD’s and R’s optimal profits under Model MD with respect 



























The proof of Proposition 8 is thus completed.
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 9
Given the equilibrium pricing decisions and sale quantities of the new and remanufactured 
products under various models, we can calculate their optimal profits as follows:
, ,*CC( ) * 1
4
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Proposition 9(2) can be directly derived from Propositions 1-4.
The proof of Proposition 9 is thus completed.
Appendix J. Proof of Proposition 10
By comparing the wholesale prices and optimal profits in the case where  with those in 0 
the case where  under Models CD and MD, it is obvious that0 
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The proof of Proposition 10 is thus completed.
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Highlights
 We study a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain with a fairness-minded retailer.
 Game analyses are conducted to characterize interactions among different parties.
 Three cooperative game coordination mechanisms are used to allocate surplus profit.
 Different coordination mechanisms offer distinct options to supply chain managers.
 We examine the impact of the retailer’s fairness concerns on profit allocation.
